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ABSTRACT
While the Europeanization literature has focused extensively on
analysing progress towards the adoption of the European model,
scant attention has been devoted to cases of resistance and
contestation, which may lead to the emergence of a new
phenomenon identified as de-Europeanization. In order to inquire
on this phenomenon, a case study analysis will be applied to
Serbian media freedom. Is this sector undergoing a process of de-
Europeanization while the country is progressing toward full EU
membership? The analysis demonstrates the recent consolidation
of a de-Europeanizing trend, coinciding with the return to power








Europeanization has become one of the most widely used theoretical approaches for
studying the EU and its impact on domestic policies, institutions, and political processes
of both member states and candidate countries, particularly with regard to its Eastern
enlargement (Börzel & Risse, 2007; Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003; Graziano & Vink,
2006). The role played by the EU conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe represented
during the 2000s a success story in the EU’s foreign policy history since EU rules, values and
norms had been successfully exported (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). A new wave
of enlargement in the Western Balkans and Turkey was initially expected to replicate this
successful outcome. However, an overview of these cases shows that the EU conditionality
has delivered mixed results. While Croatia joined the EU in 2013, Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Kosovo were unable to start the accession process; Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Montene-
gro and Turkey are all formal candidate countries with various compliance problems,
which in some cases led to a stalled accession process (i.e. Turkey) (Gordon, 2010). More-
over, even in Central and Eastern European cases like Hungary and Poland growing con-
cerns have recently emerged with regard to processes that represent a departure from
European rules, values and norms. Hence, Europeanization may not be a linear process
where EU pressures, through mechanisms of coercion, socialization or persuasion, will
eventually lead recalcitrant states to comply with EU demands. In fact, the above cases
confirm that Europeanization may progress, stall or even regress across time and issue
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areas, both among member states and candidate countries. The Europeanization literature
has focused extensively on analysing progresses toward the adoption of the European
model; however, scant attention has been devoted to cases where EU inputs have met
resistance and contestation on the ground (Börzel & Risse, 2009, p. 11), which eventually
may lead to the emergence of a new phenomenon identified as de-Europeanization
(Aydın-Düzgit & Kaliber, 2016).
In order to analyse the phenomenon of de-Europeanization, we focus our attention on
Serbia and, in particular, on the sectors connected with media freedom. The reasons are
manifold. First, being under the pre-accession conditionality—which has proved to be
more effective respect to the post-accession conditionality oriented to EU member
states— Serbia should be less affected by the phenomenon of de-Europeanization.
Second, historically Serbia has always played a strategic role for the stability of the
Balkans and this resulted in receiving high levels of attention and resources by relevant
international actors, with the EU being the most active. Hence, and thirdly, Serbia has
been constantly and intensely targeted by the EU conditionality since the downfall of Slo-
bodan Milošević in 2000, making Europeanization the most likely outcome to be expected.
Forth, freedom of expression and information represents one of the fundamental values
that form the basis of the EU; it is an intrinsic part of the Copenhagen accession criteria
and represents a precondition for implementation of other rights and freedoms. Moreover,
freedom of expression and information is crucial to establish a functioning democracy:
independent media create indispensable checks and balances on democratic govern-
ments putting pressures on political actors, fostering public debates and enhancing
public awareness on political phenomena. Fifth, and perhaps the most important justifica-
tion for selecting sectors connected with media freedom for this analysis, the publication
of the ‘Guidelines for EU support to media freedom and media integrity in Enlargement
countries, 2014–2020’ (European Commission, EC, 2014a) identifies an explicit European
model formally elaborated by the EU and directed precisely to new enlargement countries
like Serbia: this document represents a crucial tool for the analysis of (de)-Europeanization
trends in post-2000 Serbia, unavailable in such a structured form for other sectors. Sixth,
domestic and international actors have expressed growing concerns with regard to the
consistent resistances emerged in this sector (EC, 2014b, 2015, 2016): a recent report of
the Serbian Anti-Corruption Council states that in Serbia ‘the Government controls
media instead of media controlling Government’ (2011, 2015). Finally, there is hardly
any recent analysis focusing on these phenomena, neither with regard to Serbia as a
whole nor in relation with its media freedom.
The aforementioned worrying developments are quite puzzling in a candidate country
intensely targeted by the EU conditionality, and could represent evident signs of de-Eur-
opeanization. Hence, is Serbian media freedom undergoing a process of de-Europeaniza-
tion despite the country is still slowly progressing in its formal accession process? In order
to answer to this research question, in the next sections we provide a brief overview of the
literature on Europeanization, de-Europeanization and the Serbian case. Then, the empiri-
cal analysis starts with the identification of the EU standards on media freedom, followed
by a brief discussion of the historical evolution of this sector in Serbia, with specific refer-
ence to the Milošević’s regime. The last fifteen years are divided into three phases, which
delineates the major changes in government: 2000–2008 (Democratic Opposition of
Serbia, DOS); 2008–2012 (pro-EU parties are dominant within the government);

































2012-present (former Milošević regime’s successor parties control the government). In
each of these periods, an analysis of media laws, their implementation processes, and
the praxes related to this sector, will be conducted in order to assess the presence of Eur-
opeanization and de-Europeanization trends. Finally, a brief speculation about the poss-
ible causes accounting for these processes will be proposed in the concluding remarks.
This paper aims to contribute to the literatures on Europeanization and EU integration,
highlighting the emergence of the new phenomenon of de-Europeanization in the Balkan
region. Moreover, recent developments in countries like Hungary and Poland may suggest
that other examples of this phenomenon could be found even in EU member states,
perhaps leading to the emergence of a brand-new field of research in European studies.
Europeanization, De-Europeanization and the Serbian case
Although there has been a lively debate over the definition of Europeanization (Börzel &
Risse, 2003; Cowles, Caporaso, & Risse, 2001; Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003), with specific
regard to perspective and candidate countries, the term has generally identified ‘the dom-
estic impact of the EU’ (Sedelmeier, 2006, p. 4), or a linear process of domestic adaptation
to the EUmodel. This perspective is dominated by neo-institutionalist historical and ration-
alist approaches, which aim to explain domestic changes induced by the EU through the
institutional ‘goodness of fit’ of domestic and European arrangements (Cowles et al., 2001;
Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999). According to these approaches, national institutions are con-
sidered homogeneous entities subjected to similar laws of change and adaptation
under the impact of Europeanization (Delanty & Rumford, 2005; Kaliber, 2014). This kind
of bias may lead to ignoring historical backgrounds and specificities of distinct cases,
and underestimating deviancies and discontinuities in absorbing Europeanization
(Aydın-Düzgit & Kaliber, 2016). Moreover, considering the EU conditionality as an objective
and unilinear input coming from Brussels and systematically applicable to and experi-
enced by all societies engaged in Europeanization in similar modalities (Kaliber, 2014)
may lead to relevant underestimations of domestic actors, which are mostly seen as
filters of EU rules and regulations. Instead, Europeanization should be seen as ‘an interac-
tive, iterative process between actors, domestic and European’ (Featherstone & Kazamias,
2001, p. 12).
Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber (2016) adopt a more sociologically sensitive approach to Eur-
opeanization, which is gaining ground in literature (Haughton, 2007; Jacquot & Woll, 2003;
Ketola, 2013). According to Kaliber (2012, 2013, 2014), we need to distinguish between EU-
ization and Europeanization: while the former refers to a formal and technical process of
alignment with EU institutions, policies and legal structures, the latter has to be under-
stood more as a socio-political and normative context. Hence, Europeanization is ‘a
context or situation where European norms, policies and institutions are (re-)negotiated
and constructed by different European societies and institutions and have an impact on
them’ (Aydın-Düzgit & Kaliber, 2016, p. 4; see also Kaliber, 2014). Moving from this defi-
nition, the Authors consider de-Europeanization as ‘the loss or weakening of the EU/
Europe as a normative/political context and as a reference point in domestic settings
and national public debates’ (2016, p. 5). In this respect, de-Europeanization does not
imply the non-existence of Europeanization; instead, it denotes the distancing of domestic
contexts from the European system of norms, values and policy expectations (ibid, p. 6).

































Hence, in this paper we consider de-Europeanization as a departure from the European
model at the formal, institutional and policy levels and, to a certain extent, even more
at the informal level where attitudes, values, praxes and ways of doing things may rep-
resent the first and most evident signs of de-Europeanization.
Recent developments in Serbia seem to show increasing resistance to Europeanization,
despite the candidate status acquired in 2012 and the opening of negotiations on eight
out of thirty-five chapters. The Serbian integration process qualifies at best as a slow
and problematic journey. After Milošević’s downfall, international actors considered
Serbian democratization as the key to stabilize the Balkan region, and devoted a great
deal of attention and resources to reach this goal. Just a month after the transition,
Serbia entered into the Stabilization and Association Process with other West Balkan
states. However, it took five years for Serbia to open negotiations with the EU for the
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), which were called off in 2006 due to the
lack of Serbian cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia (ICTY). Negotiations were resumed one year later, after the Serbian government
showed just a formal commitment to achieve full cooperation with the ICTY. With the
aim to support pro-EU parties in upcoming elections, the SAA was signed in 2008, as
well as an Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related issues (Stahl, 2011). In 2009,
the Visa liberalization for Serbian citizens travelling to the Schengen area entered into
force, and the Serbian government officially submitted its application for the EU member-
ship. The European Council granted the candidate status only in 2012, thanks to the com-
plete Serbian cooperation with the ICTY and some improvements in the relations with
Kosovo; however, the negotiation did not initialize before 2014.
This problematic journey has been clearly identified and analysed by the literature. With
specific regard to the role played by the EU conditionality in sovereignty-related issues in
West Balkans, Noutcheva (2009) states that the perceived lack of legitimacy of this policy
led Serbia to react with ‘fake compliance’ in the case of its relations with Montenegro and
non-compliance with Kosovo. According to Börzel (2011), which argues that the impact of
the EU conditionality in the Balkans was affected by the issue of ‘limited statehood,’ Serbia
represents a special case where stateness problems led to the unwillingness rather than
incapacity to comply with the EU conditionality. Stahl (2011) argues that Serbia’s poor
compliance with EU demands depended on both EU and Serbian identity problems. On
one hand, due to identity issues the EU pursued too many different goals which led to
a ‘perverted conditionality’; on the other hand, Serbia seemed unable to deal with its
past in a way that was acceptable to the EU, and kept showing an identity dominated
by nationalism and ethnic unresolved issues. According to Subotić (2010) neither the
‘external incentive model’ nor the ‘social learning model’ (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier,
2005) can account for a complete explanation of the difficult Serbian Europeanization
process: despite consistent EU incentives and pressures as well as socialization and persua-
sion processes applied on Serbia, the Balkan country has been stuck in a ‘stalled Europea-
nization.’ Instead, the unreformed nationalist ideology, the presence of strong veto
players, and mutually hostile strategies of domestic political elites are the main factors
explaining this outcome.
Picturing the Europeanization of Serbia as difficult, slow, fake or even stalled may no
longer be sufficient in discussing the current role and impact of the EU on this candidate
country. In fact, respect to the 2000s very little attention has been devoted by the recent

































literature to developments in the overall Europeanization of Serbia, and even less atten-
tion has been paid to the evolution of Europeanization in Serbian media freedom,
which seems to point to a new direction that may be better explained by the concept
of de-Europeanization.
EU standards on media freedom
Until the launch of the ‘Guidelines for EU support to media freedom and media integrity
in Enlargement countries, 2014–2020’ (EC, 2014a), no clear EU standards on media
freedom were available. Despite being included among the prerequisites of the EU
accession process, only vague and limited indications were provided in Chapters 10
and 23. With the ‘Guidelines,’ the EU finally provided clear standards for media
freedom to the candidate states. Since there is no widely accepted definition of this
concept, this document is also relevant for understanding what media freedom is
from an EU point of view.
To improve media freedom, the ‘Guidelines’ identify three main areas to work on:
. the legal, regulatory and policy environment related to the media sector;
. the quality of media outlets’ internal governance and outputs;
. the activities of journalist professional organizations (EC, 2014a).
Since the first area represents the basis for the others, it will be at the centre of our empiri-
cal analysis, although relevant aspects of the other two components will also be reported.
Moreover, this area encompasses both formal and informal dimensions, evaluating norms
and institutions as well as praxes and ways of doing things.
The ‘Guidelines’ break down each of the main areas in ‘goals,’ ‘results,’ ‘indicators’ and
‘means of evaluation.’With regard to the first area, the goal is to identify ‘an enabling legal,
regulatory and policy environment for exercising the rights of freedom of expression and
media integrity’ (EC, 2014a, p. 6). The following are among the most relevant factors ident-
ified by the document. The Parliament has to play an important role vis-à-vis the Govern-
ment in adopting norms in line with EU laws and principles. Public officials have to refrain
from using defamation and other similar laws against critical media, which may have self-
censorship effects. There should not be impression of ‘selective justice’ in the implemen-
tation of laws that have an impact on media outlets. Harassment and physical attacks of
journalists decrease, and police and judiciary investigate and prosecute these cases in a
timely manner. Rules on access to information are in place and fairly applied. Media
sector’s regulatory authorities are established and function independently from political
interference. Media ownership is transparent. Anti-monopoly regulations are in place
and fines are proportionate. State advertising is managed in order to guarantee fairness
and equal treatment. Investigative journalism counts on legal checks against informal
economic pressures of advertising agencies or media owners/managers. Privatizations
of public media outlets are carried out in a transparent and fair way. Internet remains
free. Public service media are independent and pluralistic.
Regulations and practices that apply these standards highlight a trend of Europeaniza-
tion in media freedom. Developments going in the opposite direction denote, instead, a
process of de-Europeanization. The analysis will focus on both formal policies adopted

































and, even more so, on their implementation as well as on dominant attitudes, praxes, and
values in each given period.
Historical background of the Serbian media landscape
With the installation of the communist regime in 1945, Serbian media outlets became the
mouthpieces of the government within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The
newspaper landscape was dominated by the Communist Party daily Borba, which pub-
lished only official positions of the ruling party, and the daily Politika, which expressed
the opinions of a wider group of anti-fascist and socialist forces. During this phase, the
regime encouraged the diffusion of local print and electronic media financed and con-
trolled by local authorities. Established in 1943, the Telegraph Agency of the New Yugoslavia
played an important role in the development of Tito’s communist regime. The launch of
Television Belgrade in 1958 established a state monopoly on TV outlets (Matic & Rankovic,
2010). The communist control of the media system was gradually reduced in the 1970s
and 1980s. In 1970, for example, a new radio station was established, Studio B, which
was informative and educative such as Radio Beograd but also offered entertaining pro-
grammes. Moreover, it established the rule that no guest, even communist leaders,
could talk for more than three minutes at a time; this represented a new and positive
development in terms of fairness and impartiality (ibid.).
During the Milošević’s regime, the media sector went through relevant changes. The
system was de-monopolized, opening up to both national and local private independent
media. At the end of 1990s, there were more than 1,000 media outlets in Serbia, with the
vast majority being privately owned (NIT, 1998–2017). Considering the rapid, exponential
growth of private media outlets, they soon faced problems of financial sustainability due
to the limited development of the advertising market. Important media outlets, like Radio
B92, survived thanks to funding provided by international donors (Matic & Rankovic, 2010).
While private independent media were flourishing, authorities exerted increasing control
over traditional public outlets, such as Radio-Televizija Srbije (RTS), the newspapers Politika,
or the media agency Tanjug (Goati, 2001). Hence, state owned media prevented any
serious political debate, denying access and fair treatment to oppositions (NIT, 1998–
2017), as their main function was to mobilize support for the government.1 During the
1990s, the establishment controlled public media and limited the independence of
private outlets through a deliberate manipulation of the chaotic legal framework on this
matter; additionally, the government maintained its predominant position in the
regulation of the media system, distribution of frequencies, ownership of terrestrial trans-
mitters, production and import of newsprint, printing facilities and distribution networks.
The leadership also purposefully made the transformation of media ownership more
difficult and created a negative image of independent media, intimidated journalists, har-
assed media advertisers, and forcefully shut down media outlets (Kearns, 1999). Moreover,
Milošević could count on close allies as owners of relevant private media outlets; for
example, Željko Mitrović, a member of the JUL (Jugoslovenska Levica) party led by
Milošević’s wife, owned TV Pink and his close friend Bogoljub Karić owned BK TV (NIT,
1998–2017). Milošević’s control over independent media was by far stronger during the
Yugoslav wars and in particular crucial moments, such as the post-1996 local elections
and the 1997 electoral campaign (NIT, 1998–2017). In 1998–1999 Kosovo crisis, a new

































media law allowing the regime to shut down and impose punitive measures against dis-
sident media was adopted by the then Minister of Information and current President Alek-
sandar Vučić; as a result, several newspapers, radio and TV stations were shuttered
(Gallagher, 2000; Goati, 2001).
In conclusion, despite the opening of this sector to private independent media, during
his regime Milošević created or exacerbated many structural problems of Serbian media
freedom: a consistent role of local and national state institutions in the media sector,
lack of independence of public media, control and harassment of private media, issues
related to the ownership structures in the private sector, economic viability of indepen-
dent media, etc.
A De-Europeanising trend. Media freedom in the Post-Milošević Era
Despite receiving the candidate status only in 2012, Serbia was under the EU conditionality
since Milošević’s downfall. In fact, in November 2000 Serbia (then Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, FRY) became a full participant in the Stabilization and Association Process
(SAP). In July 2001, the European Council approved the establishment of a Consultative
Task Force—Enhancement Permanent Dialogue after the crucial 2003 EU Council
meeting in Thessaloniki—which was made up of EU and FRY delegations of experts.
The Consultative Task Force met periodically to assess FRY’s advance in the road toward
the EU, identifying the most problematic issues and finding possible solutions (Stahl,
2011). Hence, the decision to start the analysis from the democratic transition appears
fully justified.
We divided the period 2000–2016 in three phases, which delineate the major changes
in government and their approach toward the EU integration process. The DOS govern-
ments (2000–2008) were characterized by a formal pro-EU orientation that was under-
mined by the conflicting positions of the main actors involved. The less enthusiastic
pro-EU orientation of Vojislav Koštunica’s governments (2004–2008) contributed to the
stagnation of the reform process during the second part of this period. The second
phase (2008–2012) was characterized by a government dominated by pro-EU parties
(i.e. Democratic Party, DS) which raised the expectations for a new impetus in the EU
accession process. Finally, starting form 2012 the governments of the Socialist Party of
Serbia (SPS) and the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) raised contrasting expectations: on
one hand, they were the Milošević regime’s successor parties, hostile to the EU for most
of the 2000s; on the other hand, they have embraced a pro-EU orientation and pledged
to speed up the EU integration process.
2000–2008: Slow and bumpy Europeanization
If compared with the Milošević regime standards, this first period of analysis was charac-
terized by initial improvements in media freedom, which then stagnated (see Figure 1)
especially because of the intense conflicting relations within the leadership, at first
between President Koštunica and Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić (2000–2003), then
between President Boris Tadić and Prime Minister Koštunica (2004–2008). Despite the
adoption of many reforms, stimulated and guided by constant criticisms and advices
present in the EU progress reports, which moved the Serbian media sector toward the

































European model, the implementation process has often been slow and incomplete,
leaving some important features of the media system under Milošević almost intact.
One of the first decisions of the Đinđić government was to rescind the infamous 1998
Law on Public Information, which was used to thwart media freedom in the last years of
the Milošević regime. Moreover, in June 2001 the government reimbursed several inde-
pendent media outlets for the huge fines inflicted by the former regime. In 2001–2002,
in order to align with EU requests, three important laws were drafted: the Telecommuni-
cation Act, the Public Information Act and the Broadcast Act. Only the latter was adopted
by the end of 2002 (NIT, 1998–2017, 1998–2017). The main goal of the Broadcast Act was
to create an agency that could fairly distribute radio and TV frequencies, and privatize
public media outlets. This law was amended numerous times, which highlights the
complex and slow process of implementation. The Broadcast Council was created in
March 2003 but, as denounced by the EC (EC, 2004, 2006), problems related to the political
influence of the Parliament in the selection process of the board members delayed the
distribution of frequencies until April 2006 (Freedom of the Press, FoP, 2003–2016; NIT,
1998–2017).2 Moreover, as noted by the EC in its Progress Reports (EC, 2005, 2006), amend-
ments adopted between August 2004 and October 2006 further enhanced government
influence over the Republic Broadcasting Agency (RBA) while strengthening its discretion-
ary powers in distributing licences (FoP, 2003–2016; Freedom in the World, FiW, 2006,
2015).3 As critically stressed by the EU (EC, 2005), in the reform package adopted in
August 2005 the government also postponed the privatization of public media until the
end of 2007 (NIT, 1998–2017).4
The Telecommunication act was adopted in 2003 with the aim of introducing more
competition in this sector, but the board of the Telecommunication Agency (RATEL)
was not appointed until 2005 and became operational only in 2006, though the EC
claimed it was in a chronic lack of resources (EC, 2005, 2006). However, a positive amend-
ment adopted in April 2006 ensured the legal separation of entities providing different
telecommunication services (internet, fixed telephony or mobile telephony) (EC, 2006).
Figure 1. Serbia, Nation in Transit (NIT) Independent media Index 1999–2017. Source: Freedom House,
Nation in Transit reports 1999–2017.
Note: The NIT index runs from 1 (most democratic) to 7 (least democratic). The ratings most relevant in our case are those in
the middle: Semi-Consolidated Democracies (3.00–3.99) and Transitional or Hybrid Regimes (4.00–4.99).

































In April 2003, the Parliament adopted the Public information act related to the rights and
responsibilities of the media, but, as denounced by the EC in its Stabilization and Associ-
ation Reports, a too vague definition of ‘hate speech’ increased the ability of courts to close
media outlets and weakened the protection of journalistic sources (EC, 2003, 2004; FoP,
2003–2016). After repeated criticisms expressed by the EU (EC, 2003, 2004), a law on
public accessibility to information was adopted in November 2004 but its formulation
lacked clarity and its implementation was very slow (EC, 2005; FoP, 2003–2016; NIT,
1998–2017).
In September 2005, libel was finally decriminalized, in line with the position repeatedly
expressed by the EC in its Stabilization and Association reports (EC, 2003, 2004). However,
defamation was still punishable by high fines or up to six months in jail if the individual
could not pay the fine (EC, 2005; FoP, 2003–2016; NIT, 1998–2017). Although the govern-
ment refrained to use libel against journalists, which represented an improvement respect
to the previous regime, individual ministers and exponents of the former Miloševic regime
did so frequently (FoP, 2003–2016; NIT, 1998–2017). Two important positive developments
took place in mid-2000s: the end in June 2005 of the monopoly of fixed lines (EC, 2005)
and the transformation of the Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) in a public service starting
from the beginning of 2006. For the latter, the EU played extensive pressures and provided
also official support (EC, 2003, 2006).
Despite the adoption of new laws, which very often were the result of EU pressures and
criticisms, serious structural problems could still be identified during this phase. For
example, during the state of emergency declared after Đinđić’s assassination in March
2003, media freedom was heavily constrained (FoP, 2003–2016); tabloidization started
to become a serious problem (NIT, 1998–2017); information on media ownership was
ambiguous (FoP, 2003–2016); license fees were too high (FoP, 2003–2016); harassment
and intimidation of journalists, even by important political actors, were not uncommon,
especially during electoral periods (EC, 2005; FoP, 2003–2016, 2003–2016; NIT, 1998–
2017, 1998–2017, 1998–2017); and self-censorship continued affecting Serbian journalism
(FoP, 2003–2016). Finally, political interference over media was still heavy (EC, 2003, 2006).
For example, in 2004, the government substituted the RTS Director with a loyalist and
nominated a new board (FoP, 2003–2016). The situation at the local level was even
worse. After the October 2004 local elections, public media were purged and packed
with loyalists of local governments (FoP, 2003–2016; NIT, 1998–2017).
Despite the shortcomings described above, the first period post-Miloševic represented
a process of slow and bumpy Europeanization of media freedom. The improvements were
evident, as testified by the NIT Independent Media Index (Figure 1). Moreover, the adop-
tion of many new laws, influenced by EU pressures and criticisms, shows, on one hand, an
EU-ization process, which is by itself an indicator of Europeanization, and, on the other
hand, the at least partial and gradual acceptation of the EU model as the main reference
point for the direction of reform and the praxes to adopt in this sector.
2008–2012: Unexpected signs of De-Europeanization
After the February 2008 unilateral Kosovo declaration of independence, the Koštunica gov-
ernment split and new elections were held in May. Thanks also to the EU support, which
officially recommended to vote for ‘pro-European’ parties and strategically agreed to sign

































the SAA just few weeks before the elections, Tadić’s coalition ‘Serbia for Europe’ won with
39 per cent of the vote (Stahl, 2011). Despite the inclusion of Miloševic’s SPS as a junior
partner, the Cvetković government (2008–2012) was numerically dominated by pro-EU
parties and was clearly EU-oriented. However, as Figure 1 shows, not only media
freedom in Serbia did not improve during these years, it worsened to a level identified
by the NIT scale as corresponding to that of hybrid regimes and started to show the
first signs of de-Europeanization.5
A new law adopted in August 2009, which specifically made endangering the safety of a
journalist a crime (NIT, 1998–2017), is among the few positive steps undertook during this
period. Thanks to this new legislation, in 2010 three of the six suspects accused of threa-
tening B92 journalist Brankica Stanković in late 2009 were sentenced to prison terms of 3
to 16 months (FoP, 2003–2016; NIT, 1998–2017).6 Although attacks and threats against
journalists still constituted a serious problem (FoP, 2003–2016), the number of incidents
declined during this period: just 13 cases reported in 2011 against 143 in 2008 (NIT,
1998–2017). After numerous criticisms from the EU (EC, 2005, 2006, 2009), a new law pro-
hibiting unauthorized media concentration was adopted in 2009 (EC, 2011). However, its
implementation was poor and results unsatisfactory. Finally, in September 2011 a new
Media Strategy, strongly requested by the EU, was adopted, and it mainly focused on
transparent media ownership and privatization (EC, 2010, 2011). With regard to the
latter, the government committed itself to selling its stakes in media organizations, but
by setting the deadline to March 2015 it ended up delaying a process that should have
been already completed by 2005 under the 2002 Broadcast Law (FoP, 2003–2016).
Despite these small improvements, a number of laws adopted in this period show an
initial path toward de-Europeanization. In this regard, the amendments to the Law on
Public Information adopted in 2009 were among the most significant. They were highly
criticized by leading national media companies, journalist associations, the International
Press Institute, the OSCE, and the South East Europe Media Organization (NIT, 1998–
2017). While increasing accountability and responsibility of media outlets, as requested
and acknowledged by the EU (EC, 2010), the excessive severity of the penalties for the vio-
lation of professional standards and the non-registration of media outlets, and the pro-
visions restricting the right of domestic legal persons to establish a media outlet
infringed a decline on media freedom, leading to increased self-censorship and even
the closure of some media organizations (EC, 2009, 2010; FoP, 2003–2016; NIT, 1998–
2017). The RBA kept implementing and enforcing these new norms even though, in
July 2010 the Constitutional Court ruled many of them as unconstitutional (EC, 2010;
NIT, 2011).
In August 2009, the parliament passed the Law on National Minority Councils, which
allowed government bodies to transfer control of public media outlets to minority coun-
cils. In this way, public outlets could continue avoiding privatization, moving in the oppo-
site direction with respect to the current media legislation (EC, 2011; FoP, 2003–2016; NIT,
1998–2017). Thanks to the 2010 Electronic Communications Law, authorities were allowed
to maintain a database on citizens’ electronic communications, and security forces and
police could have access to the information without prior permissions. This provision
could negatively affect online communication as well as investigative journalism, particu-
larly with regard to the protection of confidential sources (NIT, 1998–2017). During this

































period, journalists were also prosecuted under the Data Secrecy Act, which protects infor-
mation of national security interests, public safety and foreign affairs (FoP, 2003–2016).
The financial sustainability of media outlets became a serious challenge in this period.
The international economic crisis negatively affected the media system, which was already
financially weak due to the highest license fees in the region and the excessive number of
media outlets in the market. In 2011, there were more than 1,000 media organizations for
just 7.1 million people (FoP, 2003–2016). This situation was aggravated by the 2009
amendments to the Personal Income Tax Law, which rising taxes on fees further impover-
ished journalists and other media staff (NIT, 1998–2017). Moreover, the Law on Cinemato-
graphy adopted in 2011, which allowed the redistribution of funds collected from media
outlets to the film industry, ensured broadcasting fees would be kept high (FoP, 2003–
2016). Public initiatives to help the media sector had little or no impact; for example, in
2009 the reduction of the fees by the RBA was too small to be relevant (FoP, 2003–
2016; NIT, 1998–2017). This economic weakness made political influence over most of
the Serbian media outlets increasingly effective, since it enhanced their dependence on
governmental subsidies and advertising purchases (EC, 2011; FoP, 2003–2016). According
to a detailed report of the Serbian Anticorruption Council covering the period 2008–2010,
the overall advertising market was around €160 million, and between €36 and €40 million
(23–25 per cent) were coming from state institutions. These public funds were allocated
via opaque and deeply politicized processes, under no supervision from any regulatory
body monitoring public spending (2011, p. 4). An equally important aspect highlighted
by this report is the lack of transparency in media ownership. Despite being explicitly for-
bidden by the broadcasting law, the presence of offshore companies in the media owner-
ship structure made it impossible to determine who the real owner was in 18 out of the 30
most relevant media outlets analysed in the study (ibid, pp. 4–5).
Overall, this phase highlights some relevant signs of de-EU-ization, which indicates the
weakening of the EU model as a reference point for domestic reforms in the media sector.
This represents an initiation of de-Europeanization, which comes unexpected because of
the pro-EU orientation of the government.
2012–2016: Consolidating the De-Europeanization trend
In 2012, the successor parties of the former regime, the SPS and Tomislav Nikolić’s Serbian
Progressive Party (SNS), moderate and pro-European version of the Serbian Radical Party,
won the parliamentary elections. Despite finishing third in the vote, SPS leader and former
Milošević spokesperson, Ivica Dačić, became prime minister of a coalition government
with the SNS. In the same month, Nikolić won the presidential elections. In the 2014 par-
liamentary elections, the SNS-led coalition ‘A future we believe in’ achieved an incredible
victory gaining 158 seats out of 250. Aleksandar Vučić, SNS leader and former minister of
information who drafted the infamous 1998 Law on Public Information, became prime
minister of a coalition government with the SPS that had an 80 per cent parliamentary
majority (NIT, 1998–2017). The same government was confirmed in the 2016 elections,
although with a less significant parliamentary majority. Officially, these new governments
were pro-European and had Serbian integration in the EU among their key priorities.
However, as the NIT index in Figure 1 demonstrates, media freedom deteriorated exten-
sively in this period, with a clearer negative path after Vučić became prime minister in

































2014.7 The signs of de-Europeanization that emerged during the previous period multi-
plied and consolidated in the following years, leading to a more evident departure from
the European model of a free media environment.
On the Europeanization side, the Criminal Code was amended in 2012 to strengthen
protection for journalists even though the maximum punishment was lowered from
eight to five years in prison (FoP, 2003–2016). After numerous criticisms from the EU
(EC, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2010), in 2013 the government established a commission
to investigate the murders of three prominent journalists, Dada Vujasinović (1994),
Slavko Ćuruvija (1999), and Milan Pantić (2001). So far, poor results have been achieved
by this commission (EC, 2013, 2016; FoP 2003–2016). In June 2013, some important
aspects of the Law on Electronic Communication were ruled out as unconstitutional
(FoP, 2003–2016). However, the major improvements headed in the direction of Europea-
nization were three media laws adopted in August 2014 in order to implement the 2011
media strategy, which were repeatedly requested by the EU (EC, 2011, 2013): the Law on
Public Information and Media, the Law on Electronic Media and the Law on Public Service
Broadcasting. Key aspects of these regulations were the definition of privatization steps for
public media outlets, the establishment of a media register to ensure transparency of
media ownership, the creation of a specific tax to finance RTS and RTV after 2016, and
the institution of state grants to support coverages that serve the public interest for
which media outlets have to compete (EC, 2014a; FoP 2003–2016).
As highlighted above, some of the key aspects leading to the consolidation of the de-
Europeanization trend were related to the implementation process of these new regu-
lations. For example, with regard to the competition for state grants there was no clear
identification of monitoring institutions and official rules in order to determine if the
tasks performed corresponded to the given definition of public interest. Hence, ample
room for political influence was guaranteed (FoP, 2003–2016). In fact, according to the
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), the majority of state funding to media
outlets was granted through non-competitive processes (i.e. subsidies and contracts)
(EC, 2014a; FoP, 2003–2016).8 Since state funds represented between 25 and 40 per
cent of an already insufficient advertising market, self-censorship of journalists and soft-
censorship of editors and managers became widespread because critical articles targeting
powerful political actors could lead to the loss of crucial advertising contracts (EC, 2014b;
FoP, 2003–2016, 2003–2016, 2003–2016; NIT, 1998–2017, 1998–2017).9
The privatization process of public outlets was finally completed in December 2015,
with a consistent delay frequently stigmatized by the EU in several progress reports.
Just 34 out of 73 public media outlets were privatized, 22 were given to employees, 4 tran-
sitioned to other industries and 13 closed. Among the former there were minority-
language outlets and the historic news agency Tanjug, which nevertheless continued to
publish on a smaller scale keeping only staff close to the agency’s management director
(FoP, 2003–2016). There are abundant claims that many of the privatized public media
went to entrepreneurs close to the SNS, which were able to recoup the costs through
grants provided by local authorities (NIT, 1998–2017, 1998–2017). Hence, a reform that
was meant to increase media independence ended up decreasing it; for example, it has
been reported that the new management of the Radio-Television Pančevo informally
told employees that in order to keep their jobs they had to join SNS (NIT, 1998–2017).

































The decline in media freedom in Serbia seems to be clearly linked to Vučić’s SNS rise to
power. In fact, it should not be considered as a coincidence that since 2014 the EU pro-
gress reports started to emphasize more and more insistently the deteriorating conditions
for the full exercise of freedom of expression in Serbia (EC 2014b, 2015, 2016). According to
the Independent Journalist Association of Serbia (NUNS), the radio show Mental Exercises
was taken off the air in December 2013 mainly for political reasons, representing a disturb-
ing example of unofficial censorship: the host had discussed Vučić’s private life just before
being cancelled (NIT, 1998–2017). In 2014, Olja Bećković, the host of an historic B92 politi-
cal talk show, claimed that her programme was cancelled on orders from Vučić. Other
popular shows were taken off the air during this period as well (NIT, 1998–2017; FoP,
2003–2016). In May 2014, the OCSE’s representative on media freedom, Dunja Mijatović,
expressed concerns about the blocking of the Teleprompter.rs and Drugastrana.rs web-
sites, which published critical reports about the prime minister.10 Vučić’s reaction was
vehement. He called Mijatović and other OCSE officials liars and demanded that the organ-
ization formally apologized for this attempt to smear him and his government (EC, 2014b;
FiW, 2006, 2015; FoP, 2003–2016; NIT, 1998–2017). In the same month, the government
declared a state of emergency following a severe flooding that devastated Serbia.
During this period, several journalists were questioned and detained for reporting on
the event (FoP, 2003–2016; NIT, 1998–2017). In August 2014, BIRN came under pressure
after publishing a critical report against the government, which, according to Vučić, was
inaccurate and financed by a wealthy businessman facing corruption charges. The news-
paper Informer and other pro-government media accused BIRN journalists of being ‘spies’
backed by the EU (FoP, 2003–2016). In January 2015, after BIRN published a report on a
case of misconduct in a public tender, the prime minister accused the investigative
group of spreading lies and, even worse, he claimed that the EU was behind this attack
aiming to destabilize his government. Public officials and pro-SNS media continued attack-
ing BIRN in the following weeks (FoP, 2003–2016; NIT, 1998–2017). In November 2015, the
pro-SNS daily Informer published a series of articles claiming that BIRN was funded by the
EU as part of a project to bring Vučić down. In the same month, TV Pink, another pro-gov-
ernment media outlet, aired a four-hour special, which had among its guests the interior
minister Nebojša Stefanović claiming that the EU funded BIRN and other media groups in
order to destabilize Serbia (FoP, 2003–2016). In the same year, the former director of the
daily Kurir accused the prime minister and the owner of the Informer of asking him to
make false allegation about the Kurir’s owner (NIT, 1998–2017). Moreover, the owner of
the Adria media group claimed he had to disseminate biased news in favour of the gov-
ernment due to the threats received by the Vučić administration (FoP, 2003–2016). In
March 2016, the Informer accused the director of the Crime and Corruption Reporting
Network (KRIK) of being a ‘French spy’, publishing details that could only be obtained
through illegal surveillance by security services (NIT, 1998–2017).
Independence of public media outlets weakened during this period. In 2016, a politi-
cally inspired purge of editorial staff in Radio-Television Vojvodina took place after the
SNS gained power in the province. At least 14 editors and journalists were removed or
demoted from their positions, while a number of critical news shows were taken off the
air (NIT, 1998–2017). Overall, RTS overrepresented governing parties with respect to the
oppositions, critical commentators and independent journalists (EC, 2015). The

































implementation of the reform on financing public TVs left them underfunded and vulner-
able to political influence (EC, 2016).
Other problems have emerged or intensified during this period. For example, public
institutions are increasingly obstructing media’s efforts to obtain public information,
often willing to pay fines instead of disclosing the requested information (EC, 2015; FoP,
2003–2016). Media ownership remains non-transparent despite the establishment in
2015 of the public register envisaged by the laws adopted in 2014 (EC, 2014b; FoP,
2003–2016). Media bias in favour of incumbent parties during election campaigns
became more evident. For example, before the 2014 parliamentary elections, the Demo-
cratic Party reported that local media controlled by the SNS suspended the service when
its chairman Dragan Đilas was scheduled to make TV appearances (NIT, 1998–2017).
Attacks on journalists intensified, increasing from 13 incidents reported in 2011 to 20 in
2014, and 34 in 2015. According to NUNS just 10 out of 34 incidents reported in 2015
were prosecuted and only two were solved (FoP, 2003–2016; NIT, 1998–2017). While the
license fees remain very high and numerous media are in debt with the regulatory
agencies, it has been reported that some of the media close to the governing parties
have seen their tax debts rescheduled (EC, 2015; FoP, 2003–2016). Many important
media closed down or changed their business strategy. For example, TV B92 announced
in 2014 that it would focus only on entertainment while Radio B92 was closed (FoP,
2003–2016, 2003–2016; South East European Media Observatory, 2016). Due to little job
security and low salaries journalists are often prone to political and economic pressures
(EC, 2016). Despite defamation being decriminalized in 2012 (NIT, 1998–2017), in 2017
journalist Stefan Cvetković was sentenced to two years and three months in prison for
defamation against three local SNS officials (Reporter without Borders, 2017).
In conclusion, media freedom in Serbia has clearly deteriorated in the past years.
Respect to the previous phases, the analysis shows EU-ization and Europeanization
going in partially different directions. In fact, the media laws adopted in 2014 represented
a move toward EU-ization, since they implemented to a large extant the 2011 media strat-
egy requested by the EU. However, the implementation process led most of the time to
opposite results respect to the ones expected; for example, the privatization process of
public media outlets, which was requested by the EU in order to improve pluralism,
ended up in reducing media space since most of the privatized outlets were bought by
businessmen close to the SNS. Major factors leading to the consolidation of a clear de-Eur-
opeanization trend of the Serbian media freedom are related to Vučić and his attitude
respect to the media system. His direct attacks and harassments toward independent
media outlets and his claims that some of them were funded by the EU in order to
bring down his government and destabilize Serbia are among the most relevant indicators
of ‘the loss or weakening of the EU/Europe as a normative/political context and as a
reference point in domestic settings and national public debates’ (Aydın-Düzgit &
Kaliber, 2016, p. 5).
Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to explore the emerging phenomenon of de-Europeanization
analysing the evolution of media freedom in Serbia since the 2000 democratic transition.
Recent developments have challenged the idea that concepts like ‘poor’, ‘fake’ or ‘stalled’

































Europeanization can still be applied to this case. As the paper demonstrates, the ten-
dencies emerged in the media and freedom of expression sectors can be better classified
as part of a process of de-Europeanization, intended as a departure from the European
model of media freedom, which is puzzling because Serbia has been constantly under
the EU conditionality since 2000 and has progressed in its EU accession process.
Although it goes beyond the purpose of this paper, we can briefly speculate about the
role played in this process by some of the most relevant factors. Starting from the inter-
national dimension, as Stahl (2011) clearly demonstrates, the EU conditionality toward
Serbia has been ‘perverted,’ favouring goals aimed at reaching short-term stability
rather than long-term ‘civilization,’ or the consolidation of a high-quality democracy to
which media freedom belong. In fact, the key factors explaining Serbian progresses
toward a full EU membership are its cooperation with the ICTY, the resolution of the
Kosovo issue and the EU’s willingness to support pro-EU political parties during elections
(ibid.). In this sense, the EU has applied very weak direct incentives and pressures to induce
Serbia to Europeanize its media sector, although many improvements in this area were the
results of EU pressures and criticisms. This lack of a strong conditionality may have left a
consistent freedom of manoeuvre to domestic actors in this sector. An important role has
also been played by the international economic crisis, which, since 2009, aggravated the
financial fragility of the Serbian media sector.
In order to explain the de-Europeanization processes in Serbian media freedom, atten-
tion and further researches should be focused also on domestic factors and actors (i.e. the
role played by relevant veto players and the strategies of domestic political elites) to evalu-
ate the modalities in which they handled the inputs coming from the EU. However, this
does not mean that the de-Europeanization phenomenon should be explained only by
agency-related approaches. In fact, with specific regard to media freedom in Serbia, the
role played by legacies of the past, a typical structure-related factor, cannot be underesti-
mated. The analysis in this article showed how legacies of the Milošević regime burdened
the Serbian media sector since the 2000 transition, due also to the lack of a strong EU incen-
tive structure in this sector. In particular, the mode of governance established during the
1990s, after the freer decades of the 1970s and 1980s, was not completely dismantled in
the first part of the 2000s. On the contrary, even the former democratic opposition to
Milošević resorted from time to time to instruments, praxes and ways of doing things
similar to the 1990s, denoting the possible occurrence of political learning processes.
Moreover, the worsening of the NIT Independent Media Index since 2008 shows a partial
and growing temporal coincidence with the rise to power of the SPS, and in particular of
the SNS and its leader Vučić. Both parties and their leaders, which represent a legacy of
the Milošević regime, may have been effective ‘carriers’ of the ways the former regime
used to manage the media sector, which constituted a radical departure from the European
model, that is a process of de-Europeanization of media freedom in Serbia.
Notes
1. In the first half of the 1990s, the SPS and its smaller sister party JUL had 1.5–10 times more
airtime than the oppositions (Dolenec, 2013, p. 168). During 2000 elections, several local news-
papers were taken over by Milošević’s allies and state-owned media obscured oppositions
(Goati, 2001).

































2. According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), this process was
‘plagued by fundamental weaknesses, deliberate disregard of the law, and arbitrary decision
making.’ (Cited in NIT, 1998–2017).
3. According to the October 2006 amendment, the Government had to approve the RBA budget
(FoP, 1998–2017).
4. At the end of 2005, there were still 150 public media outlets (NIT, 1998–2017).
5. The IREX’s Media Sustainability Index (2008–2017) and Reporter Without Borders’World Press
Freedom Index (2008–2017) confirm this negative trend in the period 2008–2012.
6. This sentence has been one of few exceptions since, normally, this kind of incidents were not
properly investigated: in the period 2007–2011 authorities have resolved only 17 out of 212
reported attacks against journalists (EC, 2009; NIT, 1998–2017). Moreover, even public con-
demnation by the government remained weak (EC, 2011).
7. This is confirmed also by the IREX’s Media Sustainability Index (2013–2017) and the Reporter
Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index (2013–2017).
8. Only 20 percent of these funds were allocated via competitive processes (FoP, 2003–2016).
9. In 2015 the advertising market corresponded to €155 million (FoP, 2003–2016).
10. In June the news website Peščanik.net was attacked by anonymous hackers after publishing
reports about allegedly plagiarized doctoral theses by prominent SNS party members (FoP,
2003–2016).
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